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In "Animal Liberation:
A Triangu
lar Affair," J. Baird Callicott delivers
what can fairly be labelled the "clas
sic" environmental ethics critique of
the animal l'ights movement.
Callicott
claims that the impression of unity
deriving
-from
the
opposition
to
humanist ethics which animal liberation
and environmental ethics share may be
"rather superficial and conceal sub
strata of thought and value which are
not at all similar."[315]
He goes on
to concl ude that
humane moralism has located
moral
value
in
individuals,
[centering] its attention on the
competing
criteria for
moral
standi ng and r'ig hts holdi ng,
while
environmental
ethics
locates ultimate value in the
"biotic community" and assigns
differential mora I va I ue to the
constitutive
individuals
rela
tively to that standard.
Allied to this difference ar'e
many others. One of the more
conspicuous is that in envi ron
mental
ethics,
plants
are
included within the parameters
of the ethical theory as well as
animals.
Indeed,
inanimate
entities such as oceans and
lakes, mountains, forests, and
wetlands
are
assigned
a
greater value than individual
animals.
. There are in
tractable practical differences
between
environmental
ethics
and the animal liberation move
ment. The animal liberation/
animal rights movement is in
the final analysis utterly unp
racticable. The land ethic, by
contrast, is eminently practica
ble. [337 -8] .

Thus,
Callicott
sees
animal
liberation
and
environmental
ethics
differing over holism vs. individual
ism, extending "direct ethical consid
erability" [312] to non-sentient enti
ties, and certain practical matters,
such as the morality of hunting, and
he believes that, because of these
differences, environmental ethics is at
least closer to providing an acceptable
ethic than is animal liber'ation.
He
also considers the holism vs. individ
ualism issue to be "perhaps the most
fundamental
theoretical
difference
between environmental ethics and the
ethics of animal liberation." [337] This
review will be confined to a critical
discussion of Callicott's "environmental
holism" and the criticism of animal lib
eration as "life-loathing" and "world
denying" [333] which he derives from
it.

II
Callicott claims that "ecology has
made it possible to apprehend the
landscape as an articulate unity" and
that "land is integrated as a human
community is integrated. "[321-2] The
moral significance of this ecological
discovery is that
the good of the community as a
whole serves as a standard for
the assessment of the relative
value and relative ordering of
its
con stitutive
pa rts
and
therefore provides a means of
adjudicating the often mutually
contradictory demands of the
pa rts con s idered sepa rately for
equal consideration. [324-5]
He goes on to claim that Plato pro
poses a similar holistic view in his
Republic, [327-9]
and,
ostensively
defi n i ng
"envi ronmental
ethics"
eth ics"
by
reference to Aldo
Leopold's
"land
ethic,"[311]
he identifies its basic
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principle as Leopold's claim that
A thing is right when it tends
to preserve the integrity, sta
sta
bility, and beauty of the biotic
community.
It is wrong when
it tends otherwise. [320]
Finally, Callicott concludes that by
adopting this environmental holism,
we human bei ngs cou Id reaffit~m
our pa rt i c i pat ion inn at u re by
accepting life as it is given
without
a
sugar
coating.
Instead of imposing artificial
legalities, rights, and so on on
natu re,
we mig ht ta ke the
opposite cou rse and accept and
affirm natural biological laws,
principles, and limitations in
the human personal and social
spheres.
Such
appears 'to
have been the postu re towa I'd
life of tribal peoples in the
past. [334]
This reaffirmation he takes to be the
opposite
of
the
"world-denying,"
"life-loathing" philosophy of the animal
I i be ration movement.
This
account
of
environmental
holism and its supposed moral conse
conse
quences raises numerous questions, of
which I shall consider the following
th ree:
(i)�
(i)
Is holism, as Callicott portrays
it, an acceptable moral position?
(ii) Is Leopold's principle an accep
(ii)�
accep
table moral pri nciple?
(iii)� Is animal liberation a "Iife
(iii)
"Iife
loathing" morality?

Both mainstream moral philosophies
and everyday Western morality have
long had a hoi i stic d imen s ion to them.
Moral philosophers as
different as
Hobbes, Jefferson,
Kant,
and Mill
agree that
a part of an individual's value lies�
lies
in his/her role in a community,�
community,
the good of the community can�
can
(morally) sometimes be cited in
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adjudicating conflicts, and
individuals can (morally) sometimes
be called on to ma ke sacl~ifices
for theil~ community.
Let us call any moral philosophy or'
everyday morality which incot"porates
these three principles "partially holis
holis
tic." Judaism and contemporary Eng
Eng
lish socialism are examples of cUt~rent,
common moralities which are pat~tially
holistic.
'
The animal libel~ation ethics pro
pro
posed by such writers as Peter Singer.
and Bernard Rollin are also partially
holistic. 1
The
strong'
utilitat~ian
strain in the animal liberation move
move
ment wh ich has developed over the
past fifteen years entails taking such
a partial holistic view, and some ani
ani
mal rights philosophers, such as Tom
Regan, have even cl~iticized such util
util
ita ria n a nimal liberation ists as Si nger
for going too far in this holistic
di rection. 2
Consequently,
it
mis
mis
I~epresents animal liberation to locate
it on one side of a simpl istic i ndivid u··
alism vs. holism dichotomy.
Howeve 1', it does not mi s I~ep resent
animal liberation, or' mainstream moral
philosophy and practice, to oppose
them to what Callicott is proposing.
The possible extreme which disturbs
Regan about utilitarian versions of
animal liberation is, apparently, just
the extreme that Callicott is advocat
advocat
ing, for he would have us believe that
an individual's moral value should be
totally determined by his/her role in a
community.
Callicott says things. like
the following in discussing (his ver
ver
sion of) envi ronmental holism:
The land ethic is holistic in
the sense that the integr'ity,
stability, and beauty of the
biotic community is its summum
bonum. , . . The good of the
biotic community is the ultimate
measure of the moral value,
the rightness or wrongness, of
actions.
In every case
the
effect
upon
ecological
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systems is the decisive factor
in the determination of the
ethical quality of actions . . . .
Modern ethical theory has con
sistently located mOt~al value in
individuals, and humane moral
ism t~emains fil~mly within this
modern convention, while envi
ronmental eth ics locates u Iti
mate value in the Itbiotic com
munity"
and
assigns
dif
ferential moral value to the
constitutive
individuals
rela
tively to this standard. [311,

320, 337]
While such statements do not explicitly
state that individuals have moral value
only through their contributions to a
community (specifically, the so-called
"biotic community"), they do strongly
suggest that that is what Callicott
u ndersta nds by "hoi i sm. "
It is this view of the moral role to
be played by holism which I shall be
referring to as "total holism" and be
discussing here.
Anything less than
this total view would not represent
the "fundamental theol"etical" break
with standard moral philosophy and
practice that Callicott sees in (his
version
of)
envi ronmental
hoi ism,
since standard moral philosophy and
practice are partially holistic.
Conse
quently, it seems not only more inter
esting but also fair to inter~pret Calli
cott's holism as total holism. 3
Now,
has Callicott provided us with good
reasons to move from partial to total
holism?
The "body of empirical experience
and theory which is summed up in the
term ecology," and which Callicott
identifies as "the ph i losoph ica I context
of the land ethic and its conceptual
foundation" [321]
cannot
(logically)
entail that we ought (morally) to take
such a step.
If all forms of life Or)
earth, including the· human form, in
some sense "depend on" each other
for their survival, it could follow that
our role in the biotic "community" is
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our "ultimate" significance,
in the
ironic way that, as Camus says in The
Myth of Sisyphus,
suicide is the
"fundamental" philosophical question.
That is, it cou Id be that unless we
pay attention to the biotic significance
of our actions, we will not be around
to appreciate aesthetic,
moral,
or
other values.
However, that these
,values would cease to exist if we
destroy the balance of nature does not
entail, or even suggest,
that our
moral value is limited to or in any
other than this it~onic sense "derives
from" the value we have for maintain
ing that balance.
Similarly, Plato's moral philosophy
does not propose or even suggest
total holism.
The guiding concern of
Socl~ates
thoug ht experiment in the
Republic is not "the integrity, stabil
ity,
and
beauty"
of
the
state.
Rather, that guiding concern is what
will produce the best life for human
beings:
Socr'ates:
My notion is that a
state - comes
into
ex istence
because no individual is self
sufficient; we all have many
needs.
. Having all these
needs, we call in one another's
help to satisfy our various
requirements;
and when
we
have collected a number of
helpers and associates to live
together in one place, we call
th at settlement a state. 4
Thus, the individual members of Pla
to's ideal state are valued not only as
contributors to the state but also as
the ends for which the state exists.
Furthermore,
Callicott
claims
that
"from the vantage point of ecological
biology, pain and pleasure seem to
have noth i ng at a II to do with good
and evil." [332]
Plato, on the other
hand,
is a paradigm eudaemonist,
arguing that the value of justice, both
i nth e s ta tea n din the i n d i v i d u a I, lie
lies
s
in the "true," enduring happiness is
provides. s Thus, the ultimate goal of
Plato's moral philosophy is found not
I
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in the structure and maintenance of a
community but in the quality of life of
individuals, the structuring and main
tenance
of
the
community
being
ordered to that end.
Consequently,
Callicott's total
holism cannot find
respectability through association with
Plato's Republic.
As noted above, another reason
Callicott gives for valuing total holism
is that it provides a way of adjudicat
in g conf I icts of interests.
Howeve I' ,
as a logical claim, that much can be
said for all moral principles, e.g., the
principle of utility,
the categorical
imperative, the ethical teachings of
the Bible, the principles of fairness
elabol'ated by John
john Rawls in A Theory
of Justice, and so forth.
Th is is
because one of the functions of moral
principles is to provide guidance in
I'esolving
t'esolving conflicts of interests.
Con
sequently, there is nothing logically
unique about total holism here.
As a practical claim, it is, to say
the least, not obvious, nor has it
been shown, that total holism would
bea more practicable guide for adju
dicating conflicts of interests than
contemporary morality is or than other
ethical theories would be. Any theory
which, like total holism, advocates a
single goal for action will be tidy.
However, total holism is not the only
moral theory which rests on only one
ultimate pI~inciple.
pt~inciple.
Utilitarianism and
Kantianism are similarly single-minded
moral theories .
Consequently, total
holism does
not have a practical
advantage on this score. We may also
note that single-principled moral theo
ries have repeatedly proven unaccep
table, and everyday morality does not
follow any such simplifying philoso
phy.
It seems unlikely that a princi
ple which proposes making the sum
mum
bonum
something
which
is
indifferent to i nd ivid ua I well-bei ng wi II
be
able
to
reverse
that
trend.
Therefore,
the. simplicity
Callicott
seems to admire in total holism may
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actually be more of a vice than a vir
tue. Thus, on both logical and prac
tical grounds, total holism's suggested
ability to adjudicate conflicts of intet~
ests does not indicate that it is pref
erable to partial holism.
Finally, there is no moral reason
for adopting total holism.
The com
mon, moral goal of reducing the suf
fering in life and otherwise making
life more enjoyable and fulfilling would
not obviously be more effectively pu roo:
sued by valuing individuals only as
contributors to a community .
Indeed,
since it is individuals, not communi
ties, which experience enjoyment, ful
fi Ilment, distress, a nd frustration and
since total holism proposes regarding
individuals as disposable items in the
pursuit of the integt~ity, stability, and
beauty of the community, it seems
reasonable
to
concl ude
that
total
holism would not provide as likely a
path to th is moral goal as ou I' cu I~
rent, mixed morality, which dit~ectly
dil~ectly
values individuals and their quality of
life. Certainly, considerable argument
would have to be provided to warrant
believing otherwise.
Similarly, thel~e
is no reason to believe that total
holism would provide a better way of
developing moral character.
Certain
traditional
moral virtues,
such
as
compassion, tolerance, love and other
emotional attachments to specific indi
viduals,
individual
initiative,
and
self-respect, could actually be dis
cou raged by va rious forms of total
hoi ism, inc Iud i n g C a II i cott' s .
Fin a II y ,
total holism need not contribute to
insuring fairness.
Insofar as a wil
derness area in which "one being lives
at the expense of others" [333] is an
example of a total holistic order~,
insuring fairness seems irrelevant to
total holism.
Thus, it seems fair to conclude
that total holism is not obviously a
superior or even an acceptable mor'al
outlook and that it would take consid
erable argument to demonstrate that it
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is-if such at'guments could be found.
Callicott does not provide that argu
ment, and nothing he says suggests
how such arguments could be devel
oped.
(I have not fOLi nd that other
envit~onmental holists pt~ovide compel
ling Ot' cohet'ent arguments for total
h 0 Ii s m, e i the t' . )
ii
Turn
to
Leopold's
claim
that
whether something is right or wrong
is determined by whether or not it
contributes to the integrity, stability,
and beauty of the biotic "community."
Is this an acceptable moral principle?
Once again, there are both practical
and logical questions here.
This
time, we shall consider the practical
issues first.
Callicott is clearly opposed to the
utilitarian elements in contemporary
morality, which he identifies as "a
prophylactic
ethic
of
maximizing
rewards
(pleasure) and
minimizing
unwelcome information (pain)," [323] 6
and ,he sees Leopold's principle as
pointing us toward a more strenuous
way of life.
He seems to reg ret that
"it is impossible today to return to
the symbiotic relationship of Stone
Age man to the natu t~al envi ronment"
and to favor all of the following:
simple diet and vigorous exercise, a
renaissance of tribal cultural experi
ence, cu Itivating a tolerance for pai n,
optimizing population by sexual conti
nency,
abortion,
infanticide,
and
stylized warfare, regarding sickness
as.a worse evil than death, eating
only what one can hunt, gather, or
g."OW for oneself or barter ft'om one's
neighbo.·s and friends, and leaving
people who at·e injured in wilderness
areas to get out on their own or "die
in the attempt." [327, 334, 336,338]
There are the
"practical"
conse
quences
of
the
ethic
Callicott
describes as "eminently practicable."
As

these

consequences

indicate,

(Callicott's interpretation of) Leopold's
principle is fundamentally out of touch
with
contempora ry mora Iity ,
wh ich
emphasizes compassion for the injured,
the sick, and the handicapped, toler
ance for diverse ways of life, concern
to expand the diversity of opportuni
ties and experiences available to peo
ple, protecting the weak against the
strong, and hope for progress. Cal
licott doubtless regards this being out
of touch as a ma rk of the hoi istic
environmentalists'
willingness
"to
undertake creative ethical reflection,
exploration,
[and] reexamination of
historical eth ical theory." [319]
How
ever, since "mot·ality" is a common
concept, rather than a technical term
which experts can stipulatively define,
its meaning is established through our
common,
mot~al
practice.
Conse
q uently, to the extent that a proposed
"ethic," meaning merely "a code for
conducting one's life," is fundamen-.
tally out of touch with our common
moral practice, to that extent it is
questionable whether that proposed
code is a morality at all.
Significant moral criticism of com
mon, moral pt~actice cannot (logically)
be based solely on the findings of a
science, such as ecology, remote from
the history and practice of morality.
Significant moral criticism must (logic
ally) be based, at least in part, on
currently accepted moral principles or
values. Even Immanuel Kant, perhaps
the most abstract of moral ph i1oso
phers, acknowledges this, beginning
his Foundations of the Metaphysics of
Morals with a section on the "Common
Rational Knowledge of Morals" and
confirming his ultimate moral principle
by showing that it yields the same
answers as everyday morality in four
clear cases. Similarly, animal libera
tionists commonly call for the libera
tion of animal s as the next step,
beyond combatting racism and sexism,
in extending our common, egalitarian
moral principles to all those who suf
fer by not bei ng covered by them.
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This requirement that significant moral
criticism keep in touch with moral his
tory and practice is, presumably, why
Callicott attempts to draw an analogy
between his environmental holism and
Plato's moral philosophy.
However,
that analogy fails.
This leaves it
highly doubtful
that
environmental
holism provides a basis for moralcrit
icism of moral practice or moral phi
losoph ies, such as an imal liberation,
and equally doubtful whether environ
mental holism is, itself, a moral phi
losophy at all.
The terms of Leopold's principle
reinforce this' doubt.
Leopold men
tions three specific values in his
principle:
integrity, stability,
and
beauty.
The
last
of
these
is,
directly, an aesthetic value.
It can
take on moral significance only by
being tied to some moral value, e. g.,
through the principle that "Goodness,
truth, and beauty are one and the
same" or the argument that "Beauty is
something people enjoy; so, since the
principle of utility instructs us to
maximize happiness, we ought (mor
ally) to consider the aesthetic conse
quences of our actions when determin
ing What
what we ought
(morally) to do."
Leopold and Callicott have not pro
vided
principles
or
arguments
to
establish ·the moral significance of the
beauty of the biotic community. Since
Leopold's principle is supposed to be
the fundamental principle of the land
ethic, stating its summum bonum and
ultimate measure of moral value, the'
logic
of this
total,
environmental
holism would seem to preclude such a
principle or argument.
Consequently,
it is, at least, highly doubtful that
the beauty of the biotic community can
have moral significance here. 7
The first of Leopold's value terms,
"integrity,"
can
refer
to a moral
value, but the term does not here
have its moral meaning.
It does not
mean "probity," "rectitude," or "firm
adherence to a code of values." Talk
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of "the probity of the biotic commu
nity" would be nonsense.
Rather,
"integrity" her'e means "unity"
and
"completeness," referring to the con
dition of not having been dismembered
or otherwise reduced to a truncated
version of its fully functional form.
Thus, "integrity" here denotes bioJo
gical or ecological conditions.
Once
again,
some principle or argument
tying these conditions to moral values
is needed to give them moral signifi
cance, and, once again, neither Leo
pold nor Callicott pt'ovides, nOI~ likely
could provide, such a pt~inciple or
argument.
Finally, the second of Leopold's
three value terms, "stability," also
refers to a physical condition-and it
definitely is startling to see this con
dition offered as an ultimate value for
a
"biologically
enlightened"
value
theory in a post-Darwinian era. Once
again, we are given no reason to
believe that the stability of the cur
rent state of nature has moral signifi
cance.
Thus, there is nothing in Leopold's
principle which identifies it as a moral
principle.
Labelling
something
an
"ethic," in the sense· of being a code
for conducting oneself, such as "the
hunting ethic," does not establish that
it is a code of moral values or even
that it has moral significance.
The
moral value of hunting remains an
open question, even though hunting
has long had an "ethic. "8 Considet~a
ble argument is needed to show that a
principle referring to an aesthetic
value and ecological conditions has
moral value, let alone expresses an
acceptable, ultimate moral pl"'inciple.
Until such argument is provided, if it
can be provided, the so-called "land
ethic"
would
less
misleadingly
be
renamed "the land aesthetic" or "the
ecologist's code."
Beyond his mistaken analogy to
Plato's Republic, the only suggestion
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Callicott offer's for why we should
r'egar'd (his inter'pretation of) Leo
pold's envi r'onmental pt'inciple as a
moral principle is that
the rept'esentation
repr'esentation of the natu
ra' environment
as, in Leo
pold's
terms
"one
humming
community" brings into play,
whether
rationally
or
not,
those stirrings of conscience
which we feel in relation to
delicately complex, functioning
social
and
organic
sys
tems. [322]
However, this suggestion begs the
question, for it is fa r fr'om obvious,
that the envi ronment can properly be
described as a "community" in a mor
ally significant sense.
Ecologically,
"community" means merely "a group of
plants and animals living in a specific
region under relatively similar condi
tions" or "the region in which they
, live. "
[American Heritage Dictionary]
Ther'e is nothing here of the feeling
of community, including being cooper
ative, mutual care and respect, shar
ing of burdens and responsibilities,
emotional
and
moral
attachments,
intentionally formed alliances, a sense
of obligations to, responsibilities for,
or' rights against other members of the
group, and identifying with, feeling
one can rely on, and feeling one is
making a contribution to the group-all
of which contribute to ma ki ng commu
nities morally significant.
Lacking all
of these dimensions, a merely ecologi
cal "community" lacks moral signifi
cance.
That plants
and
animals,
including ourselves, need each other
and other inorganic things, such as
unpolluted water and air, in order to
survive does not make us a "commu
nity" in a morally significant sense,
and to try to stir moral feelings by
employing that term in discussing eco
logical issues is to equivocate and to
substitute rhetoric for argument.
Until further argument is supplied
to show, if it can be shown, that
Leopold's
principle
is
a
moral

principle, it seems fair to regard his
land "ethic" as the statement of the
way of life he personally preferred,
rather than as a mor'al principle.
Some people like cities and luxury;
others prefer the countr'y and auster
ity-in terms of the substance of Leo
pold's principle, the significance of
the'land "ethic" is that it provides a
guide fot, the latter group.
Finally, Leopold's pr'inciple could
be given moral significance, if it pro
vided useful guidance for accomplish
ing ou r common, moral goals.
How
ev e r , it i s do u b tf u I t hat it can p Iay
that role.
As already indicated, . it
would not, at least as interpreted by
Callicott, encou rage the development
of some morally highly. pt'ized charac
ter traits, such as compassion.
Also,.
it would not help to insure fairness,
since it would, apparently, counsel
against defending the weak against
the strong.
Finally, in directing us
to cultivate a tolerance for pain, to
leave injured people to die, to destroy
animals in order to save plants, and
so forth, it seems unlikely that it
would provide us much guidance in
reducing suffering and otherwise mak
ing life more enjoyable and fulfilling.
Consequently, Leopold's principle is
not likely to be of service in attaining
our common, moral goals.
It seems fair to conclude that for
all the above reasons, Leopold's prin
ciple is not an acceptable moral prin
ciple.
(This is not to say, of course,
that ecology cannot provide important
information
for
making
enlightened
moral decisions.)
iii
Finally, let us briefly turn to Cal
licott's charge that animal liberation is
world-denying and life-loathing. Mor
ality involves inhibiting and redirect
ing native desires and tendencies, and
in its fully developed form, it also
involves projecting "better worlds" for
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us to work towar·d.
It follows that
concerns, values, pr"inciples, codes,
guides for action, etc., cannot be
restricted to merely "accepting life -as
it
is
given"
and
"accepting
and
affirming natural biological laws, prin
ciples, and limitations," if they are to
constitute a mor"ality.
Consequently,
taken at face value, Callicott's sup
posedly
"life-affirming,"
"world-ac
cepting" environmental holism cannot
(logically) be a moral ity.
Such advice can take on moral sig
nificance only if it is understood as
encouraging us to do something which
is not currently being done and which
would make for~ a better world.
Since
Callicott proposes the land "ethic" as
an alternative not only to animal lib
eration but also to contempora ry, civ
ilized
life,
he,
apparently,
does
understand it in this way.
However,
when so understood, the ph rase "I ife
as it is given" cannot (logically) refer"
to life as it actually is being led by
us. Thus, Callicott is not really pro
posing that we "accept life as it is
given."
Rather, behind that mislead
ing rhetoric, he is rejecting life as it
currently is and advocating that we
follow a way of life as he wou Id like it
to be.
Furthermore, suggesting that,
as far as possible, we foresake tens
of thousands of years of evolution and
history and return to the way of life
of Stone Age tribes marks Callicott's
"ethic" as a particularly "world-deny
ing"
vision.
Consequently,
when
interpreted in the way which makes it
logically possible for Callicott's "ethic"
to be a morality, it is neither life-af
fi rming nor world-accepting.
On

the

other

hand,

refusing

accept and affirm avoidablesuffer'ing,
unfair distributions of goods, uninhi
bited aggression, and so forth, are
refusals which have long been and
conti n ue to be pa rt of everyday mor
ality.
As such, they are a well-es
tablished part of life as it is.
Animal
liberation
extends
such
concerns,
which have traditionally been focused
on the human world and on human
life, to include equal consideration for
animals.
I n this way, animal libera
tion is simply carr~yin-g on the busi
nes's of
everyday
moral
practice.
Therefor"e, it does not loathe or deny
life as it is.
Rather, unlike Calli
cott's proposed retreat to the wilder
ness, animal liberation is participating
in life and, hopefully, .in its continu
ing moral evolution.
III
Thus, Callicott's total, envir"onmen
tal holism and his criticism of animal
liberation have little, if anything, to
recommend them as moral theory and
criticism.
First,
Callicott has not
provided any reason for believing that
holism should be more than a par"t of
mor"ality. Second, the specific holistic
principle Callicott advances, namely,
Leopold's so-called "land ethic," has
not been shown to be a moral pr"inci
pie at all nor to be of particular~ use
in attai n i ng ou r common, moral goals.
Finally, Callicott's criticisms of animal
I iberation
are
i ncoherent ~
Conse
quently, total holistic, envi ronmental
"ethicists" will have to mar'shall a
great deal more argument, if that can
be done, in order to show that their
principles and criticisms are morally
sig n ifica nt.

to

Steve F. Sapontzis
California State University, Hayward
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Notes

1.

Peter Singer, Animal Liberation
(New Yor~k:
Avon Books, 1975),
Chapter 1, and Bernard Rollin,

is broken."
He
simply passes
over the fact that in addition to
delivering unwelcome information,
pain hurts.

Animal Rights and Human Moraiity
(Buffalo:

Prometheus

Books,

1981), Part I.
2.

While this is clearly a criticism of
Callicott's conception of environ
environmenta I eth ics, it is not enti rely
clear that it is an objection to
Leopold's
position.
Th is
is
because it is not clear that he
regarded his principle' as just an
ethical principle.
He introduces
that principle in A Sand County
Almanac (Oxford: Oxford Univer
University Press, 1949) with the follow
following remarks:
Quit thinking about decent
land-use as solely an eco
economic
problem.
Examine
each question in terms of
what is ethically and esthet
esthetically right, as well as what
is
economically
expedient.
[224, emphasis added]
Consequently, it may be that Leo
Leopold intended "beauty" to have
only aesthetic significance in his
principle.
Callicott,
however,
does not even suggest spl itti ng
Leopold's principle into aesthetic
and (supposedly) ethical compo
components.

8.�
8.

Robert W. Loftin makes this point
in
"The Morality of
Hunting,"
Environmental Ethics 6 (1984), pp.

See Regan's "Utilitarianism, Veg
Vegeta ria n is Ii1 ,
and Ani ma I Rig h t s, "

Philosophy & Public
(1980), pp. 305-24.

3.

7.

Affairs

9

Evelyn
Pluhar
also
interprets
Callicott's position in this way, in
"Two Conceptions of an Environ
Environmental Ethic and Their Implica
Implications, "
Ethics
& Animals
IV
. (1983) , p p . 120
120-- 3 , and Ernest
Partridge, another noted environ
environmental ethicist, at least does not
object to this interpretation of
Callicott's
position,
in
"Three
Wr~ong Leads in a Search for an
Environmental Ethic:
Tom Regan
Valon Animal Rights, Inherent Val
ues, and 'Deep Ecology, "' Ethics &
. Animals V (1984), page 73, note

18.
4.�
4.

Republic,

II,

368-9

(Cornford

translation) .

5.
6.�
6.

Ibid., IV, 576-592.
Callicott treats pain as if it were
merely an organic monitoring sys
system putting messages on a mental
display screen, e.g., "Your ankle

241-50.

